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IN THE

SUPREME .COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT T. WAGNER and
REBECCA L. WAGNER, _
his wife,
Appellants.,
vs

Civil No. 7761

JOSEPH A. ANDERSON,
Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF FACTS
In view of the fact that Appellants' Statement
of Facts includes certain allegations and contentions
of Appellants therein denominated as Facts, which
Respondent can not agree to, Re~pondent contends
that the following are the essential facts for a determination of this appeal.
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On August 11, 1951, Appellants filed a Complaint against the Respondent (Tr. 1) in which,
among other things, they sought specific perform•
ance of a real estate contract, attorney's fees and
spe.cial damages. On August 25, 1951, Respondent
served upon Appellants a written notice of intention
to proceed with the contract, and wherein he tendered to Appellants the purchase price for the property
(Tr. 19).
.

On or about August 31, 1951, Appellants accepted the purchase price for said property and conveyed their interest therein to the Respondent. During the interval between s_aid tender and conveyance
negotiations were had between the parties in which
Appellants' attorney stated Appellants would not
dismiss the action unless the attorney's fee and damages were settled. Respondent's attorneys commented in substance that if the action were not dismissed the parties would be required to have the
matter heard and dete:nnined by the Court.
On September 10, 1951, Respondent filed an
Amended Motion to Dismiss (Tr. 12) which was
heard on September 13, 1951, and granted by the
Court, and a written Order of Dismissal made and
entered on September 15, 1951 (Tr. 22). Thereafter, on September 19, 1951, Appellants filed a
Motion for rehearing ( Tr. 18) which was supported
by :Affidavits of W. W. Kirton, Jr. (Tr. 14) and
Lothaire R. Rich (Tr. 16). Respondent filed a
counter affidavit (Tr. 20). A hearing was had on,
said motion for rehearing which was denied by the
Court.
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
I

The Court did not err in dismissing the Complaint.
ARGUMENT
This is an action,for specific performance of a
real estate contract. Included in the Complaint is a
claim for attorney's fees and special damage. After
the Complaint had been filed Respondent served a
notice on Appellants indic·ating his willingness to
proceed with the contract, and wherein he tendered
the purchase price to them. The Appellants accepted
the purchase money and conveyed their interest in
the property to Respondent.
Respondent contends that ,by accepting the purchase money and conveying the property Appellants'
cause of action was extinguished and the attorneys'
fee and damages, being mere incidents thereto, were
likewise extinguished, and the Court had no further
jurisdiction in the cause than to dismiss the action.
If a tree falls because it is cut off at the roots the
branches must also fall.
There is no question but what the Court may,
under certain circumstances, award damages in lieu
of specific performance, as indicated by the cases
cited on Page 9 of Appellants' Brief, but in none of
those cases was there a satisfaction of the specific
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performance phase of the law suit and thus they are
not in point so far as the question now before this
Court is concerned.
Appellants apparently place great, reliance on
the case of Hall, vs. Great American Insurance Co.·
252 N. W. 763, cited on Page 10 of their Brief. In
the Hall case the claimant in an action against an
insurance company for a fire loss dismiss.ed a Complaint for everything in the policy, except that he
reserved his right to claim a loss for a diamond stud,
which claim the Court held he was able to pursue
against the contention of the insurance company that
he could not split his cause of action and pursue it ·
piecemeal. The Hall case can readily be distinguished from the case at bar. · In the Hall case the
claim for the diamond stud was a part of the cause of
action itself, and by dismissing the Complaint as to
the other items the claimant merely eliminated them
·from the cause of action, but he still had a cause of
action left with respect to the diamond stud. Whereas, in the case at bar the cause of action which the
Appellants sued upon was for specific performance.
The attorneys' fee and ·special damages were merely
incidents thereof and were not ~eparate. items of a
cause of action which could be sued upon alone. By
acceptance of the purchase price and making a conveyance of the property the Appellants extinguished
their cause. The claim for attorneys' fee and damages, being mere incidents thereto, were extinguished when the cause itself was gone. The authorities
support th~s position.
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A case very similar to the one at bar, in that it
was a suit for specific performance, is that of Pr~
Shoop Family Medicine Co. vs. Showalter, 98 N. W.
940 (Wis.). This was an action in equity brought to
compel the specific performance of a contract. The
Plaintiff claimed an Agreement had been made between Plaintiff and Defendant whereby for a commission of $50.00 the.Defendant was to purchase certain property in his own name for the Plaintiff. The
Defendant purchased the property for $1375.00,
'vhich sum the Plaintiff thereafter paid, but Defendant refused to convey the same to the Plaintiff. The
Defendant filed a Counter Claim in which he claimed
certain amounts were owing to him totaling $175.00
and offered_ to convey the property upon payment of
that sum. The matter was submitted to the jury for
·an advisory verdict. After the jury returned averdict in favor of Plaintiff the Plaintiff moved for
Findings and judgment in favor. The Defendantobjected upon the ground that a settlement of the
controversy had been had by the parties wherein the
Plaintiff ~ad paid the De~endant $50.00 and the Defendant had delivered a deed to the property to him.
In discussing this point the Appellate Court said on
Page ~41:
"We can not but regard this as a voluntary
settlement of the controversy by the parties
pending the litigation and the only remaii).ing
question is as to the effect of the settlement upon the litigation itself. Upon this question the
conclusion qf the trial Court seems to have been
that there was a complete loss of jurisdiction
and that the action can never be disposed of, but
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must be left forever hanging between Heaven
and earth like Mohamet's coffin. This was certainly an erroneous idea.' Although there was no
jurisdiction to try the controversy because the
controversy had passed out of existance, still
there was jurisdiction left in the Court to dismiss both the Complaint and the Counter Claim
because the controversy had been settled. Where
no controversy exists a court will dismiss the
action for that very reason. Williams, vs. Williams, 117 Wis. 125, 94 N. W. 25. So while the
Court was right in refusing to make Findings
and Judgment for the Plaintiff upon its original cause of action jt was wrong in holding that
there was no jurisdiction in the Court to enter
any judgment and wrong in denying the motion to dismiss -the Counter Claim. Judgment
should have been entered dismissing both the
Complaint and the Counter Claim. There could
be no costs properly granted to either party upon the dismissal, because both causes of action
had been entirely extinguished by the settlement. Except in case of some express statutory
provision an extinguishment of the entire cause
of action by settlement pending the action with
no 1nention of costs, extinguishes the right to
costs. Geiser T. M. Co. vs. Smith, 36 Wis. 295,
17 Am. St. Rep. 494. Two Rivers Manufacturing Co. vs. Beyer, 74 Wis. 210,42 N. W. 232, 17
Am. St. Rep. 131. Cernahan, vs, Chrisler, 107
Wis. 645, 83 N. W. 778. It seems best to reverse
·the entire order and direct the proper judgment." (Emphasis Ours.)
A case involving attorneys' fees and costs is
Cloquet, vs. ·Department of Labor and Industries of
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"\Vashington, 268 Pac. 602 (Wash.) . In this case
the appellant sustained an injury in the course of his
employment fQr which he claimed workmen's compensation. .-\.fter monthly payments had been made
the department attempted to termin~te the amount
of compensation by making an order to that effect,
which \vas appealed from to the Superior Court.
Mter the appeal had been taken the department
made further arrangement for payment of monthly
compensation and about a year later a settlement
was made in which he was given an award of
$900.00. After the settlement had been made the
appellant attempted to appeal from the first order
wherein he claims that he should be entitled to attorney's fees and costs. The Appellate Court denied
such recovery and discussed the question as follows:
"(2-4) Appellant also argues that, if his
appeal was well taken the judgment of the court
reversing the department would have allowed to
him costs and attorneys' fees, and seems to contend that notwithstanding the settlement with
the department by which he secured cancellation of its order and a reinstatement of his previous classificatio:Q, withj all of the benefits
flowing therefrom, which he had accepted and
retained, he may now proceed to trail, use that
settlement as proof that the cancelled order
was erroneous, and now recover his costs and attorneys' fees. Such a proceeding would be wholly
inequitable. Moreover, when litigants compose
their differences and wipe out the subject of the
litigation, nothing being said about costs and
attorneys' fees, it is to be presumed that each
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party will bear his own, and in any event, when
the subject matter of a lawsuit/is by agreement
of. the parties finally and fully settled,. the
courts will not further retain jurisdiction for
the purpose of deciding questions relating to
costs.
"Judgment is affirmed." (Emphasis ours.)
Another case which sets out the principle in unmistaken language. is Two Rivers Manufacturing
Company, vs. Beyer, 74 Wis, 210~ 17 Am. St. Rep. ·
131, wherein it was held in an action to foreclose a
tax lien where, during the pendency of the suit the
Plaintiff accepted the full amount of the lien, that
his cause of action was thereby terminated and that
a judgment rendered thereafter for costs was void.
In discus~ing that the Court says on Page 136:
''The tax certificates were the cause of action
, and the full cause of action of that suit of foreclosure. They are to be foreclosed in the same
manner as mortgages ( R. S. Sec. 1181) and
are the cause of action the same· as mortgages
are the cause of· action in suits of foreclosure.
The redemptio~ of the lands from the certificates pending the suit in foreclosure must have
the same effect upon the suit as the payment of
the mortgages or the redemption of the lands
from the mortgages pending suits for their foreclosure. In both cases respectively the tax certifi-·
cates and the mortgages are the subject matters
of the suits. The sole object of the suits is to
foreclose them and the sole result is the judgment of foreclosure. The suit is brought upon
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them and on account of them alone ... In all·
possible respects they are the same as any other
cause of action such as a promissory note or a
bond for the payment of money, for trespass or
damage, feasant or any other which may be
satisfied or discharged· by the payment ·of
money and for which a judgment may be rendered. There could be no action without such a
cause or some cause of action. When such a
cause no longer exists there is no longer any
cause of action and the action is at an end. An
action could not continue as an action when the
cause has been removed~ any more than an action could be commenced without a cause of action. The costs are merely incidental to an
action based on a sufficient cause of action, and
are not part of it, but the creature of the statute
which can only follow a judgment or final determination of an action in which the cause of action is merged. An action can not be brought
merely for the costs thereof, nor can an action be
maintained after the cause of action has been
removed merely· for the costs thereof, for then
they would be no longer incidental, but the principal of the suit. Can an action be commenced
to foreclose a mortgage, or tax certificate, or on
a note or bond, or for tresspass after the mortgage or tax certificate has been redeemed, or the
note or bond had ·been paid and the trespass
satisfied and the money had been accepted by
the Plaintiff? No more can such actions subsist
and continue to a judgment after such redemption, payment or satisfaction had been acknowledged by the acceptance of the money. The action is ended when the cause of action is taken
out of it."
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Another case, Obert, vs. Zahn, 145 Pac. 403
·(Okla.), was one for unlawful detainer. After the
action was filed the Defendant yielded possession of
the premises, which were accepted by the Plaintiff.
The Appellate Court held that by Plaintiff having
~ccepted possession of the premises the Court lost
jurisdiction of the matter and had no power to enter
judgment for possession or costs. The Court quoted
the language from Two Rivers Manufacturing Company, vs. Beyer, supra.· The Court also quoted from
the case of Geiser Threshing Machine Co. vs. Smith,
et ·al, 36 Wis. 295, 17 Am. St. Rep. 494, which is an
action on a promissory note wherein attorneys' fees
and costs were involved. The excerpt is as follows:
"The facts were that on March 17, 1873, summons and complaint in the action were delivered
to the sheriff with intent to have the same served upon the defendant; that before service defendant paid plaintiff's attorney the principal
and interest on the note in full, who accepted
the money, but claimed $17.00 costS; whereupon, defendant refusing to pay, a surrender of
the note was refused upon that ground. Service was thereafter had. 'The note contained an
agreement to pay plaintiff 5 per cent for attorney's fees if suit was brought thereon. On this
state of facts there was judgment for plaintiff
for costs, from which defendants appealed. In
reversing the case the court said it was not neces~ary to decide when the suit was commenced:
"Because, whether it was commenced or not,
the acceptance by the plaintiffs of full payment
of the amount due on the note extinguished
their right to prosecute it. It may be that the
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plaintiffs might have refused the payment _and
prosecuted the suit to judgment for damages
and costs. But they could not receive the damages and reserve the right to prosecute the suit"
for costs. Canfield v. School District, 19 Conn.
529; Ayer v. Ashmead, 31 Conn. 44 7 ( 83 Am.
Dec. 154); Buell vs. Flower, 39 Conn. 462 (12
Am. Rep. 414)."
Many other cases are quoted in the Zahn case,
and the Court concludes as follows:
"We are therefore of opinion,- when- pendente
lite defendant yielded possession of the property
in controversy, as he did, that there was left remaining no issue to try; that the court lost jurisdiction of the subject matter, and hence could
render no judgment affecting the same, and
there being no agreement as_ to the costs, erred_
in taxing the same against defendant."
CONCLUSION
The Court did not err in dismissing the Complaint, and its Judgment should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
ROMNEY, BOYER & BERTOCH
Attorneys for Respondent
1409 Walker Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

